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Abstract 
This paper argues that to prevent or lessen the impact of episodic water stress within 
modern political economies, harnessing and tailoring emerging modes of legitimacy 
will play a crucial role in formulating pragmatic, solution-focused policy. In setting 
out a case for this position, we analyse the role which existing and novel modes of 
legitimacy play in shaping the boundaries and opportunity spaces for policy tool 
development. Central to the arguments outlined is a rethinking of the concept and 
practise of ‘legitimacy’ to include informal relationships between actors and amongst 
institutions. Legitimacy's re-evaluation is pertinent as existing demand management 
elements of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) become increasingly 
ineffectual in the face of escalating water stress. This paper's focus is on the interface 
between IWRM and socio-political values associated with potable water. This leads 
us to concentrate almost exclusively on public water supply issues within developed 
countries. It is argued that adaptive water management techniques will play a key role 
in policy development; but only if strategies recognise the need to engage with the 
diverse range of legitimacy models which typify late-industrial societies. The paper 
reviews theories of state action, civic participation and sovereignty to explore, 
through the use of case studies, what types of legitimacy models, and what types of 
policy to enact these models, could be used to support strategies to alleviate water 
stress.  





This paper argues that the role of legitimacy is pivotal in the development of adaptive 
water management strategies. In recent years, the growing phenomena of water stress1 
has revealed a limitation in the ability of the Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) discourse to galvanise action and effect solutions to complex social, 
economic, political and environmental problems. The paper explores how the concept 
of legitimacy may assist in the development of an alternative focus for IWRM 
processes. As legitimacy operates within socio-political contexts this narrows the 
focus of the paper to address water management strategies that deal with public water 
supply and, to some extent, environmental services. In other words the focus lies 
within ‘blue’ water resources rather than ‘green’ water resources (Falkenmark and 
Rockstrom, 2004). Although IWRM issues connected with agriculture, and in 
particular irrigation, are challenging, they are not covered by the contribution 
presented below.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 
outlines how a ‘flattened’ concept of legitimacy reflects the reality of post-industrial 
societies. This perspective is then contextualised in the following section through the 
use of three case studies which lead us on to a discussion of how legitimacy can 
enhance adaptivity in water management. Finally, our conclusions outline a set of 
research gaps and reflect on the desirability of manipulating legitimacy debates to 
support adaptive management approaches.  
Any approach to the problems experienced by IWRM must begin by understanding 
the issue of water stress. Water stress is a complex and emerging phenomenon in 
natural resources management. The causes of water stress are not simple to categorise 
and include environmental, economic and social triggers. Water stress events can be 
episodic or stochastic and differ in their length and degree of severity. Whilst each 
event can be understood as a unique conglomeration of contributory factors, they can 
also be emblematic of a progressive decline in natural resilience, social cohesiveness 
or both. Ohlsson (1999) has defined natural water shortage in semi-arid and arid areas 
as ‘first-order scarcity’; put simply, not enough available water per head of 
population. A society's inability to adequately conserve, protect or utilise its water 
resources to meet needs is classed as ‘second order scarcity’.  
Theoretically, developed countries should be able to overcome first order scarcity 
through technical and financial capabilities However, this paper asserts that it is 
IWRM's continued focus on demand management strategies that is hampering the 
development of policy tools to tackle water stress. It is argued that as many developed 
societies may well need to adjust to increasingly frequent episodes of water stress 
(Arnell, 1998) this will necessitate a step on from the demand management focus of 
IWRM to developing water management strategies founded on concepts of adaptive 
capacity.2  
Adaptive management has been described as ‘learning-by-doing’ and promulgates an 
iterative three-stage continuum of action, monitoring and adaptation. In each of these 
three stages, alternative hypotheses are used to evaluate the successes of any decision 
making process (Norton and Steinemann, 2001). These adaptive strategies require 
room to learn through experimentation and failure. Pertinent to these novel techniques 
for IWRM is an appreciation that solutions may lie outside of the water sector and 
within the domain of the non-expert. Although IWRM theory is underpinned by the 
idea of community management of water resources, the difference between IWRM 
and adaptive management lies in the execution of theory in practise. If water stress 
events are reflections of a wider macro level problem set, solutions may lie outside of 
the IWRM domain entirely. Indeed, we may need to look to adaptive management to 
create the space in which IWRM theory can manifest itself into a policy provider 
which is truly integrative.  
The theoretical framework that underpins adaptive approaches as a natural resource 
management strategy are well established (e.g. Holling, 1978 and Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). The concept of legitimacy, explored in more detail in the following 
section, describes the formal and informal ways in which processes, policies, 
structures and agents are validated and consequently empowered. As a conceptual 
device, legitimacy has roots in legal theory, but has also been used by social scientists 
to explain how norms are generated, how power operates and how institutions and 
regimes remain stable over time (Beetham, 1991). Though legitimacy is usually 
employed to explain relationships of representation, our argument adopts a broader 
reading of the term which sees legitimacy as a facet of good governance.3  
Theories of good governance suggest criteria for evaluating legitimacy. Many such 
theories distinguish between the level of ‘input legitimacy’ (the issue of how 
decisions are taken) and ‘output legitimacy’ (whether a goal has been successfully 
achieved) (Scharpf, 1999). However, we need to push this model further if we are to 
fully understand how legitimacy becomes embedded in a cultural context. This 
anchoring of legitimacy has been described by Schimmelfennig (1996) as ‘social 
legitimacy’; such social or popular legitimacy is paramount to securing successful 
input and output legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is re-sited then, away from formal institutions and actors and is relocated 
within a network of relationships that are constantly in flux. Thus, achieving policy 
goals, for example, must take into account the economic, social and political networks 
which legitimate or delegitimate policies, practises and people. Put another way, 
legitimacy is discursively determined; it is constantly subject to review, assessment 
and revaluation. This makes it a potentially volatile attribute. Examples of scandalised 
politicians, ousted Chief Executives, and reformatted policy in response public outcry, 
all demonstrate legitimacy's mobility and fragility. Essentially it also underscores how 
far legitimacy resides within common debate and remains an iterative, tangible social 
concept. If a process, person or policy is viewed as socially legitimate, then there is 
likely to be a higher value placed on input legitimacy; conversely an absence of social 
legitimacy may compromise or dilute possible option spaces4 for outputs. Legitimacy 
is gained then through a cycle of achievement which is self-reinforcing. When formal 
policy implementation processes attempt to demand validation without achievement 
then there is a divide between formal authority and popular support—this is known as 
the ‘legitimacy gap’.  
To place this agenda within a wider consideration of water resources planning and 
management, we would note that historically, whilst formal methods of water 
resources planning (e.g. Cost–Benefit, Multi-Objective or Market-Based approaches) 
have generated useful technical tools for tractable problem sets, they fail to address 
the issue of policy implementation or deployment. Identification of a least cost, or 
best practicable option is only half a solution. Effecting policy options where we 
recognise the operating environment to be complex, multi-actor, and perhaps unstable 
is only partially eased by an understanding of trade-offs. Other social and political 
factors need to be manipulated if selected policy mechanisms are to be successfully 
promoted and adopted. We need to evaluate how far narrowing the ‘legitimacy gap’ 
could play a role in shaping the option spaces for policy tool development and 
deployment within the context of adaptive water management. Our argument will 
develop in the next section.  
2. Concepts of legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a key concept in political theory, one which explores and explains 
relationships between actors and institutions in which authority, or power, has been 
delegated. The prevalent models of legitimacy in social, legal and political theory tend 
to see it as a model of sovereignty i.e as being formally enshrined in codes and 
practises in which power is delegated.5 This is useful in that it can explain the way in 
which both government and policy are justified. Yet sovereignty as a macro model of 
legitimacy is obstructive if it prevents us, as discussed above, from appreciating that 
legitimacy operates as a network that brings together both institutions and actors in 
what could be visualised as horizontal inter-linkings, rather than a vertical ‘top-down’ 
hierarchy. Put simply, it might be suggested that legitimacy as sovereignty is visible 
whilst legitimacy as a network is invisible. For example, the legitimacy of the English 
and Welsh water companies to manage public water supplies is enshrined within the 
1989 Water Act. Yet the Internal Drainage Boards (IDBs) which provide drainage 
services to many parts of the country, and are co-operatives run by landowners remain 
relatively unknown. We would suggest that IWRM at present addresses the visible, 
yet it has failed to articulate strategies to address the invisible. Without both, IWRM 
does not provide a robust platform for responding to water stress challenges. Using 
the above examples, IWRM processes need to also include insights and participation 
from grassroots organisations such as the IDBs to gain embedded legitimacy.  
There is then an obvious need to both broaden and deepen the remit of the IWRM 
discourse. Recognising that water stress cannot be alleviated by demand management 
alone and that concepts such as international water markets, ‘virtual water’ (Allan, 
1997) and radical technological innovation may become mainstream, water 
management moves from the realm of experts to inhabit a communal space—both 
externally in terms of efficient water use practises in the garden and use of water 
efficient technologies and internalised through emerging norms such as a willingness 
to use recycled water or varying qualities of water. Foucault's work (see Foucault, 
1970 and Foucault, 1972), which posits that in the post-industrial era boundaries and 
ideas of sovereign territory and sovereign resources begin to dissolve, illustrates the 
new terrain facing IWRM. IWRM becomes truly integrated by entering every domain 
of social relationships. The formal location or arena in which legitimacy is negotiated 
thereby becomes fragmented. Yet it is timely here to remember that the pace and 
nature of change is guided by a very powerful dynamic—it will be the developed 
countries that initiate the change and determine the scope. How far water-scarce 
developing countries will have the ability to fit into these changing global 
relationships is yet to be seen and outside the remit of this paper.  
We cannot talk of citizenship without discussing water rights, or, more pertinently, 
rights to water. Whilst a review of rights to water is a discipline in itself there are a 
few key points relevant to adaptive management approaches. Firstly, a ‘right to water’ 
is a concept which operates within specific political economies. This is because a 
right is a legal concept which can only operate within the rule of law. Yet it is 
recognised by international institutions, such as the UNEP and WHO, that access to 
safe and reliable water is a human right as decreed by Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) because it is essential to maintaining an adequate 
standard of living. We have then not a right to water but a right to a guaranteed 
standard of living which cannot be attained without access to a safe and reliable water 
source. Much work has been undertaken since 1948 to declare water in itself as a 
human right; not just as an adjunct of standards of living indicators. For example, the 
1994 Water Act of the Republic of South Africa strives to develop a supra-
constituency in which the regional, racial and economic divides of old South Africa 
are abolished. The Water Act demands as much: ‘These guiding principles recognise 
the basic human needs of present and future generations, the need to protect water 
resources, the need to share some water resources with other countries, the need to 
promote social and economic development through the use of water and the need to 
establish suitable institutions in order to achieve the purpose of the Act’ (RSA 
National Water Act 1998:14).  
What is enshrined here is a vision of freshwater as inseparable both from citizen's 
rights and the long term welfare of the nation. In terms of adaptive management it is 
this ethos of a unified approach to freshwater management which is crucial. The 
South African example demonstrates that rebuilding legitimacy between state and 
citizen through inclusive water policy making has real potential. The following three 
case studies examine how different modes of policy making can also have a positive 
impact on legitimacy building.  
3. ‘The Legitimacy Gap’: three case studies 
This section presents three short case studies that highlight different approaches to 
legitimacy building. The first, the privatisation of the English and Welsh water sector 
in 1989 details the transition from public to privately owned water supply networks. 
The second, reviewing a public water authority's response to a drought event in 
Australia, examines the rationale of using price as the main tool of demand 
management progressing to a more disciplinarian set of policy instruments. The final 
example, which reports a water contamination incident in the small town of 
Walkerton, Canada, explores the issue of legitimacy in the context of local/national 
dialogues. Each example is used to illustrate how the cultural, economic and political 
make-up of a different set of circumstances will shape the option space for the 
successful implementation of policy instruments and therefore determine a relevant 
legitimacy agenda.  
3.1. Case study 1: the privatisation of the English and Welsh water sector 
Privatisation of water in the UK typifies neo-liberal economic policy approaches 
(Browning, 2000). In England and Wales the privatisation of the water sector led to a 
full scales divestiture of assets and was far more radical than in other countries where 
there has been a gradation between full public ownership options and total 
privatisation of service and assets (Winpenny, 1994). The intended aim of the 
privatisation process in England and Wales was to increase investment levels and 
reduce costs. It was also hoped that privatisation would improve efficiency, service 
standards and technical capacity (Summerton, 1998 and Richardson et al., 1992). We 
will suggest, however, that despite the transformation of the sector, there remains a 
worrying legitimacy gap.  
If one studies the process of English and Welsh privatisation, one finds that great 
regard was given to making sure changes were regarded as legitimate. Richardson et 
al. (1992) detail the courtship of the water boards and local government by central 
government in order to slowly convince them that not only was wholesale change 
necessary, but also achievable. The success of the privatisation process also relied on 
developing an industry which appeared dynamic; water companies appearing as 
commercial ‘players’ in order to attract foreign direct investment. The most 
challenging aspect of privatisation, though, was the goal of persuading water users to 
accept water privatisation and to spur them to become shareholders. This was 
particularly difficult as opinion polls of the time revealed between 70% and 80% of 
the population were opposed to the privatisation process (Ernst, 1994), as it was 
perceived as a selling off of a national heritage.  
Perhaps the very achievement of water privatisation shows that those in charge of 
marketing strategies did have an appreciation of legitimacy issues, although, as we 
will show, there remain concerns as to whether the divestiture model was the most 
appropriate. Given the initial hostility of popular opinion6 to the privatisation process 
it is useful to isolate three strategies which might explain why the new water 
management structure was accepted.  
Firstly, the rapidity of change left little chance for criticism. In just 18 months, from 
the Water Act's ratification in July 1989 to the sale of the Water Holding Companies 
in December 1989, the sector was transformed in terms of regulatory structure, 
financing and ownership. Secondly, the mode of change was also significant. It 
embraced the economic mood of the decade. Privatisation was pitched as a means for 
everyone to become part of a share-owning democracy. The third factor that led to the 
perception of privatisation as a success was the relative stability of prices and 
continuity of the water holding companies post-privatisation (the changes seemed to 
be in name only). This lessened the upheaval. In summary, it could be suggested that 
the limited consultation process coupled with exceptionally strong state endorsement 
can be seen as the engine behind the seemingly successful re-configuration of the 
water industry.  
However, the ability of the water sector to transform and continue to thrive does not 
mean that the legitimacy agenda has caught up. The most convincing explanation for 
the apparent ease of transformation was the monopolistic nature of the industry-
customers could not simply switch providers or refuse to consume. There are other 
indications that privatisation has not been accepted. From a disregard of water use 
limitations (Haughton, 1998), to non-payment of bills by consumers who know that 
they cannot be easily disconnected, and a general disgruntlement with private 
ownership of the sector (MORI, 2002) there has not been total public support. Indeed, 
Bakker describes the disjunctures brought about by privatisation as the ‘primary 
source of the legitimacy crisis of the privatised water industry’ (Bakker, 2001. p157). 
The example of the English and Welsh water industry privatisation suggests that what 
was meant to be a reform directed towards efficiency of management remains a 
politically contentious act.  
3.2. Case study 2: the Sydney Water Authority and the 1999 drought 
Our second example focuses on policy tool adaptation as a specific response to acute 
water stress during a drought period in Australia. However, many factors contributing 
to the drought, including poor river quality, an ageing infrastructure and rapid 
population growth are symptomatic of IWRM challenges facing Australia. 
Specifically, this case study shows that unpopular policy mechanisms can be 
successful if high profile education campaigns are used to explain the reasons behind 
the policy, thereby legitimating action. Sydney Water, a private water supply 
company regulated by the government, has been experimenting since 1999 with a 
range of demand management programmes as part of a national programme of 
policies to counter increasing water stress. These range from incentives (e.g. cash 
back for installing water efficient appliances), to new standards (such as labelling of 
all water using equipment to indicate efficiency levels) and outright water use 
restrictions. For the purposes of this study we will focus on the restrictive measures.  
In November 2002, as an adaptive response to an ongoing drought period, the 
company initially introduced voluntary water restrictions to the city of Sydney and its 
surrounding suburbs. This new policy instrument was focused at the micro scale. It 
restricted garden watering from 8 am until 8 pm (except for the use of recycled water 
and drip irrigation) and the hosing of any hard surfaces such as drives and cars at any 
time. Working in collaboration with the Sydney Catchment Authority (responsible for 
the bulk water resource) and drafted by the New South Wales minister for Energy and 
Utilities, these restrictions only applied to households and were entirely voluntary.  
Although the government and the water company used the term ‘restriction’, no 
mention was made of possible penalties for refusal to comply. Instead, the language 
(disseminated through the media in the forms of press releases, fact sheets and 
interviews) focused on citizen responsibility and a community shaming approach. 
Neighbours were invited by the local press to inform the company of contraventions 
to the restrictions. The local Catchment Authority also requested the names and 
addresses of those not complying with the restrictions, principally so that deviators 
could be sent water saving advice pamphlets. That the restrictions focused upon 
external water use, and therefore not to private but to public utility, signals strongly 
that the resolution of water shortage was being presented as a community 
responsibility. Press releases detailed restricted practises and contained other pieces of 
data intended for public consumption. Attention was drawn to statistics concerning 
groundwater and reservoir levels as a percentage of normal capacity. A “hit list” of 
non-contentious ways to conserve water around the home was also published.  
In terms of legitimacy issues, these publications contained a pervasive theme: ‘us 
against nature’; a more exaggerated approach than the mainstream national IWRM 
approach which advocates collective (i.e. municipal and individual) approach to 
demand management. The point was to create public ownership of the problem, and 
to unite three different spheres—market, regulators and consumers against the 
drought event. The continued severity of the drought has lead to these semi-voluntary 
restrictions becoming upgraded to ‘level 3’. Garden hosing is now limited to early 
morning or evening on Wednesdays and Sundays only. Car washing with a hose is 
forbidden and permits are required for swimming pools over a certain size. Sydney 
Water officers now patrol suburban areas and can issue on-the-spot fines of $220 
Australian dollars for contravention of the restrictions. In tandem the Sydney Water 
Authority has also announced in July 2005 plans to develop a £1.5 billion desalination 
plant. This will provide Sydney with 500 million litres of potable water a day. 
Anecdotal evidence gathered by the local media suggests that these twin 
developments have been accepted as necessary; though hostility remains regarding the 
siting of the desalination plant.  
It can be suggested that by introducing voluntary restrictions prior to state enforced 
penalties the public are more prone to accepting the need to develop more adaptive 
water management strategies. The legitimacy terrain has been gradually sculpted 
through information campaigns and readily accessible scientific data. Clearly scaling 
up policies in response to highly visible falling reservoir levels has also provided the 
IWRM agenda with legitimacy.  
The three characteristics of the handling of the drought in Sydney, namely 
governance, leadership and information management, can be seen in their wider 
context of galvanising Australian IWRM and overcoming weaknesses regarding scale, 
decision making and accessibility that have slowed its national adoption. The success 
of the Sydney Water Authority approaches has seen residential water use dropping by 
12% since September 2003 (Turner et al., 2005). In terms of the long term evolution 
of a consolidated IWRM process in Australia, the Sydney case study illustrates a 
successful method of obtaining ‘buy in’ from domestic and individual consumers and 
developing a cohesive plan of action. The high ‘output’ legitimacy created by the 
Sydney Water Authority taking an incremental approach has created a feedback loop 
leading to strong ‘input’ legitimacy for the water management institutions.  
3.3. Case study 3: the Walkerton incident, Ontario, Canada. May 2000 
This well reported case study (see, for example, Snider, 2004) is a prime example of 
how a high level of input legitimacy within a local community leads to adaptive, 
solution-focused responses despite negative events. In this example, the small 
community of Walkerton was affected by a sudden, unexpected outbreak of 
Escherichia coli contamination to their local water supply (O'Connor, 2002). 
Confirmation of the contamination came not from the local public water supplier but 
from a general practitioner who was alarmed by a sudden rise in illness amongst the 
very young and old within this small community. Of special interest is that the 
dissemination of this public health event came not from the community itself seeking 
explanations, but from the local and then national media who lobbied hard, 
challenging the public water company to explain its inaction. This media interest is 
contextualised by the former Socialist government's stance to include the 
environmental lobby in policy making. Canada's IWRM model includes municipal 
water companies underscored by a hands-off approach to central management. The 
media frenzy can therefore be seen as a tool to argue against ministerial budget cuts. 
This case study notably demonstrates the flexibility that personal responsibility and 
reliability can foster. As this was a small community the head of the water authority 
was a high-profile community member and known to most. As the news of the 
contamination reached the national press, the community responded by exploiting 
social cohesion and common interest, reacting in a unified and dignified manner to the 
problem. The implicated water company employees were not made scapegoats; rather 
the whole community were interested in finding the cause of the problem and 
ensuring it was not repeated. Instead the management problem was treated as a 
tragedy which nobody wanted to happen, with the whole town rallying in support of 
those residents associated with the water company against the aggressive interference 
of the media.  
This case study reveals the absence of a legitimacy gap, despite the unenviable 
circumstances. Whilst this could potentially be dismissed as a normal facet of small 
town life in such a litigious age, events on this scale (hundreds were made ill for up to 
6 months and seven people died as a result of the contamination), it would be 
unhelpful to look into other factors which have created this supportive network. Using 
legitimacy as a tool to explain the reaction to such an event, we can say that the high 
level of input legitimacy evident in all public figures encountered within the example 
leads to a reflexive, mutually supportive community. The indirect blame was accepted 
as the result of central budget cuts. There is no evidence of a gap between consumers 
and water authority, as water authority staff are also recognised as consumers too. We 
could argue that it is the open accessible relationship between the two which has 
created this supportive legitimising relationship. It also reflects the largely rural nature 
of potable water provision in Canada. Provincial IWRM approaches are more 
meaningful at community level than federal policies. The case study subsequently 
provides us with a method to improve input legitimacy in IWRM strategies by 
investing resources in the contact time between water company and user. Would 
investing money in building community relations or developing community teams 
negate the need for undesirable, unpopular or unsuccessful coercive policies?  
Another outcome from the Walkerton tragedy was the response of the community to 
suggestions that water experts had let them down. The consensus seemed to be that 
the problem stemmed from experts being asked to rely on technology rather than their 
training and expertise and that technology had also reduced their numbers, leading to 
an over-reliance on technology to provide safety. What the community were arguing 
then was to let the ‘local’ back into water guardianship. Again, this returns us to 
Schimmelfennig concept of social legitimacy; that subsidiary level expertise and local 
knowledge would always balance social and environmental needs far better than 
macro based planning. In terms of our adaptive management philosophy we can say 
from this example that the legitimacy gap is obliterated when people are privileged 
over technology. This has been addressed at a provincial level by the establishment in 
October 2004 of the ‘Walkerton Clean Water Centre’ to train staff in managing small 
and remote water systems. There is recognition then in terms of long term IWRM for 
Canada that its size and scale mean that localised, specific responses are more 
meaningful than adopting broad-brush macro policies. Again, this case study 
illustrates an adaptive approach in response to shifting legitimacy concerns.  
In all three of the examples described above we see macro and micro level changes to 
the governance of the water resource; multiple stakeholder involvement, and temporal 
lags between policy mechanism deployment and the reconfiguration of the legitimacy 
landscape (Table 1).  
Table 1.  
Case study evidence for impacts on the legitimacy terrain  
 Macro governance change 
Waterprivatisation in England and Wales Structural; public to private assets. Development of strong regu
 Macro governance change 
 Macro governance change 
 Macro governance change 
Sydney drought event Water curfews. 
 Macro governance change 
 Macro governance change 
Walkerton State municipality takes over local water company. 
 Macro governance change 
 Macro governance change 
 
Common to all three examples is the reconfiguration of multiple legitimacy terrains 
which involve different actors at different points in the process. Also common are the 
selective perspectives which are offered. In the case of the privatisation process, 
consumers were offered a stake through share options whilst having no route to 
disagree with the macro changes involved. In the Sydney case neighbours become 
water policemen and the drought event is provided with a scientific explanation rather 
than general mis-consumption by users, leading to a recognition of the need to 
reconfigure IWRM approaches in response to new water stress drivers. The 
Walkerton example illustrates how even high levels of embedded legitimacy can be 
quickly eroded if the community has no way of rationally dealing with problems of 
locally induced risk in an age when safety is generally safeguarded by policy. All 
three examples show in different ways the enormous difficulties of implementing 
IWRM policy changes and the gap between the policy goal and the means to 
successfully operationalise adaptive policy tools. However, can we draw any wider 
lessons about the structures of legitimacy from these illustrative instances?  
4. Legitimacy's role within adaptive IWRM strategies 
If we accept that managing the water environment is beyond hydraulic engineering 
alone and, furthermore, if we accept that demand management can only ameliorate 
water stress to an extent, then we can start to focus on what kinds of strategies an 
approach founded on adaptive capacity will engender. Table 2 suggests examples of 
characteristic legitimacy agendas for three types of policy instrument; supply led, 
demand led or adaptive. Whilst adaptive responses to water stress will be self evident 
in some areas (for example greater water use efficiency in the home and the use of 
water hardy crops in agriculture) it is in the longer term impacts on society where the 
legitimacy gap will be most acutely felt. Water stress may affect future food security, 
economic security, international trade relations, it may dictate the jobs we do, where 
we live and how we live. On a fundamental level, increasing water stress could raise 
moral and ethical questions as to how we balance, replace, or abandon, individual 
freedoms and community approaches to our use of water resources. Addressing the 
structural shifts that developed societies will need to undertake is not something that 
can be undertaken by one sector, or during one term of government.  
Table 2.  
Examples of changing legitimacy agendas across modes of water management  
 Characteristic legitimacy agendas 
Supply led strategies • Needs of society supercede needs of natural environment. 
 • Targets of universal supply mean that urban customers cross-subsidise rural cus
 • Large (volumetric) water users have a greater input into policy making than ind
Demand led strategies • Full cost recovery principle moves water from a solely social to a principally ec
 • Water pricing to deter use penalises those on a lower income. 
 • Part or full privatisation of the water industry of a commodity which is a natura
Adaptive strategies • Solutions to food security may lie outside of national boundaries (virtual water)
 • Social justice and social equity to be included in the pricing of, and access to, w
 Characteristic legitimacy agendas 
 • Radical economic restructuring may take place at a national or regional (Europe
 
For adaptive management to flourish within IWRM it needs to become an integral 
part of the way we value and use freshwater resources, in the same way that concepts 
like ‘individual liberty’ or ‘democracy’ become, over time, accepted and legitimised 
as intractable societal goals.  
IWRM policies must enable change to occur at a pace that will be accepted; but is this 
possible? Social relations with water as a commodity are vastly different from more 
mundane, pedestrian market products. Water has culturally specific roles in society 
(Strang, 2001). Changing these norms at a progressive pace may not be fast enough to 
cope with escalating water stress.  
The enhancement of adaptive capacity involves multilayered and multi-temporal 
policy tool development which will involve coercive, remunerative and pliable 
policies. As the exploitation of adaptive capacity necessarily involves sectoral shifts, 
the meta problem is that of co-ordinating these changes. Although we can see that 
some policy mechanisms can change behaviour and attitudes in certain key areas, 
whether individual states itself have the capacity to provide an integrated response to 
such wide ranging questions is another matter.  
One of the key areas that need to be tackled through IWRM strategies and processes, 
is the development and strengthening of concepts of legitimacy in relation to water, 
between actors and amongst institutions. Given a scenario of increasing global 
susceptibility to water stress, dynamics will necessarily change, from formal 
legitimate relationships between water supplier and water consumer to enhanced 
relationships of guardianship between citizens and the resource. We can see the 
potential of these changing relationships to foster dynamic and emerging forms of co-
supporting legitimacy between community groups and policy makers moving 
outwards onto the global arena to initiate trans-boundary inter-state relationships to 
mitigate conflict situations through the further development of international 
legitimacy.  
Deepening structures, processes and systems of legitimacy then will prompt planners 
and policy makers to recognise both formal modes of legitimacy and the informal 
devices through which ideas and practises are negotiated. We recognise the 
difficulties which policy makers face when trying to co-ordinate the different 
expectations, operations and actors that will need to be factored in to an adaptive 
capacity framework. The landscape of legitimacy will likely take longer to 
reconfigure than that of policy mechanisms; our concern is that legitimacy will lag so 
far behind mechanism change as to severely compromise the effectiveness of each 
policy option.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has argued that the role of legitimacy is pivotal in the development of 
adaptive water management strategies. This is not to assume that there is one type of 
legitimacy; rather we can isolate that developing (i) social or (ii) coalitional 
legitimacy will support adaptive strategies far more effectively than current 
experiences where there is a legitimacy gap. Future IWRM success will be dependent 
on a holistic appraisal of water's role in society. By recreating a ‘social’ contract 
between water consumer and water guardians, legitimacy widens the opportunity 
space available to planners and policy makers.  
Our portrayal of IWRM as being in need of a revised appreciation of the role of 
implementation support tools (in this case legitimacy) reflects wider censure of the 
extent to which IWRM theory has been realised as practice: ‘There is still a long way 
to go to achieve a common understanding of IWRM and to develop and re?ne 
approaches for its successful implementation.’ (Jonker, 2002, p. 719). Perhaps the 
most insightful observation regarding this gap comes from a book review which, 
although published over a decade ago, still rings true today. The review draws 
attention to a shared ‘basic faith in the concept and aims of integrated management’ 
but also points out that ‘despite some achievements and extraordinary capital 
investment, national governments have by and large failed to sustain truly integrative 
programmes.’ (Westcoat, 1992). Other commentaries have pointed out that IWRM is 
immature as a management tool. For example, ‘IWRM has neither been 
unambiguously defined, nor has the question of how it is to be implemented been 
fully addressed. What has to be integrated and how is it best done? Can the broad 
principles of IWRM be operationalised in practice—and, if so, how?’ (GWP-TAC, 
2000). Contemporary concern over this lack of applied success is such that the United 
Nations Environment Programme was recently prompted to classify the conversion of 
the concepts of integrated water resources management into practice as “Unfinished 
Business” (IWA/UNEP, 2002).  
Our thesis as presented in this text conjectures that, for policy makers, the task is in 
managing sectoral shifts equitably. This requires a subtle array of tariffs, quotas, re-
education, public participation and indirect taxes and other tools available to the state 
to enable a valuing of water as both a local and global resource. We are then left with 
a puzzling array of choices which seem to combine into a line of argument which 
champions social responsibility but recognises that this has to be developed by both 
hard tactics, an appreciation of monetary cost and reasoned debate. This integration 
(coordination plus assimilation) of policy mechanisms across space, time, sector, and 
social grouping will require new legitimacy dialogues which will themselves require 
fine tuning to match cultural and historical circumstances. Illegitimate solutions, 
particularly where there are significant pressures on resource availability, are likely to 
be unstable as a basis for resource governance and will undermine wider forms of 
social cohesion. The challenges which adaptive management goals generate are 
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1 The United Nations utilises Malin Falkenmark's ‘Water Stress Index’ to classify 
water stress as reached when annual renewable freshwater supplies drop below 
1700 m3 per person. When this figure drops to below 1000 m3 per person the 
population is deemed to face water scarcity (Falkenmark and Widstrand, 1992 and 
Stikker, 1998). Critics of the Water Stress Index argue that this gross accounting for 
national water budgets disguises regional disparities (Postel, 1992) and may not 
include environmental concerns in the distribution of water resources (Global Water 
Partnership, 1996). Whilst water stress can be caused or exacerbated by natural 
phenomena and global warming (Herrington, 1998, Arnell, 1998 and Lomborg, 1998) 
it can also be the result of structural problems in which supply from the resource to 
the user is erratic, low-quality or insufficient (Lomborg, 1998 and Winpenny, 1994). 
Falkenmark has further refined her definition to highlight the disparity between ‘blue’ 
water and ‘green’ water resources. Solutions to water stress can then lie within the 
realm of efficient management. 
2 Crudely, adaptive capacity details the way in which individuals, organisations and 
economic sectors develop and retain the ability to adjust to changing circumstances. 
3 Other hallmarks, or modes, of good governance include accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. For further reference see Rhodes (1997). 
4 An option space is the set of choices that decision makers select from. Often the 
actual option space does not map directly onto the perceived option space of the 
decision maker. Option spaces are also malleable. Policy goals can be achieved both 
by widening option spaces and by modifying conceptual spaces to match. 
5 Arguably, in liberal theory legitimacy receives three somewhat different kinds of 
emphasis. This thesis can be exemplified by reference to pervasive themes in legal 
and political though. There is insufficient space within this paper to thoroughly 
critique the various models of legitimacy, but, what can be suggested is that different 
models of legitimacy can be seen as privileging (i) freedom, (ii) functionalism, and 
(iii) integration. Legitimacy as freedom, or autonomy, is initially found in the work of 
Hobbes (1996)—legitimacy as the passing up of some individual freedom for a 
greater collective freedom is also explored in Rousseau's (1994) notion of the ‘social 
contract’ and articulated more recently in the work of John Rawls (1999). Legitimacy 
is viewed by these contributions as a conduit to create constitutional stability which 
then develops into a shared social consensus. Legitimacy can also be seen as 
functional. The work of Joseph Raz (1988) is exemplary in this context. Legitimacy is 
depicted as enabling; providing a consensual mediation between citizen desires and 
the limits of practical authority. Legitimacy as integration can be found in the work of 
Ronald Dworkin (1996) who places legitimacy firmly within a notion creating an 
integrated social structure of rights and principles. 
6 Opposition included bad press from the national media (Haughton, 1998), a 
rebellion in parliament (Richardson et al., 1992) and negative results from public 
opinion polls (MORI, 2002).  
 
 
